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WACE FLOORS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMrNT
 
Cary S. Fields
 
Revised Version: December, 1986
 
1. INTRODUCTION
 
The goal of economic development is to raise standards of living
 
throughout an economy. Most persons' standards of living are determined by
 
their labor earnings. Consequently, rising real wages at full employment
 
are rightly viewed as a primary means of improving living standards.
 
Some countries pursue policies a:Lmed at pulling wages up. They
 
produce for the world market and achieve high GNP growth. Firms demand
 
more and more labor in the productive process. Ultimately, full employment
 
is attained. Competition for labor then Pulls wages up further. Japan,
 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are examples of economies which
 
have relied primarily on such wage pull mechanisms; see Fields (1985).
 
Host other countries have not been content to wait; see Paper #V 
for evidence. Five institutional forces, singly or in combination, have 
potent influences cn wages in most of the developing world.1 Minimum 
See, for example, Reynolds (1965, 1969), Turner (1965), Berg (1966, 1969),
 
Smith (1967), Knight (1967), Eriksson (1970), Thormann (1970), Todaro
 
(1971), Turnham (1971), Cregory (1974), Watanabe (1976), Starr (1981),
 
Kannappan (1983).
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wage laws are commonplace and when enforced cause wages to be higher tQan 
they otherwise would be; Labour unions often are very strong, -At -times,­
this is because of the close association-between organized labour-and the
 
political party in power. Other times, it in because labour unions are
 
encouraged as a means of achieving higher wages for workers. PaY, policy 
for government workers often sets the pattern of wages for the rest of the 
economy, and those in charge have a propensity to pay high wages to all 
government workers (including themselves). Also, multinationals often pay­
high wages, partly to maintain parity between expatriate and local gm­
ployees, and partly (in some instances) to appear to be good corporate 
citizens and thereby-to avoid expropriation or expulsion. Finally, labor 
codes may require higher wages, fringe benefits, and severance pay, 
resulting at times in blontcd work forces and inflated labor costs. 
I shall refer to minimum wages and other wage-increasing institutions
 
collectively as "wage floors." Throughout the paper, they are assumed to 
be set in reei terms, therefore not be eroded by inflation or devaluation. 
These wage floors typically are sector-specific: unions are stronger in 
some firms and industries than in others, minimum wage laws apply to some 
establishments and localities but not to others and are enforced with 
different degrees of diligence, and so on. As a stylized version of the 
differential applicability of wage floors, economists from such disparate 
fields an development economics, labor economics, and international trade 
have formulated two-sector models with a wage floor in one sector but not 
the other. Wage floors would be axpected to affect directly the sectors 
involved and to affect indirectly via migration and other general equili­
brium phenomena the other parts of the economy. Among the development 
3
 
variables influenced would be Gross Domestic Product, employment and
 
unemployment, total wages received by labor, income inequality, and
 
poverty.1
 
This paper inquires into the nature of these effects from a theore­
tical point of view. More specifically, the question considered is:
 
If a minimum wage or other wage-increasing institution
 
succeeds in establishing a wage floor in the modern
 
sectors of a developing economy, what development
 
effects result?
 
The analysis developed in the body of the paper leads to the conclusion
 
that the answers are neither clear-cut nor unambiguous. The development
 
effects of wage floors may be positive in some circumstances, negattve in
 
others. Simple arguments asserting that wage floors are good (because it's
 
better if workers are paid more) or bad (because wage floors introduce
 
factor price distortions) are shown to be simplistic. The truth is more
 
complicated.
 
II. 	THE EFFECTS OF WAGE FLOORS IN ONE-SECTOR MODELS
 
A. 	The Analytical Starting Point: The Textbook Analysis of Wage
 
Floors
 
To a remarkable degree, economists of virtually all analytical and 
political persuasions bolieve that wage floors have undesirable effects. 
Those who hold this belief range from sophisticated general equilibrium­
analysts to non-specialists familiar only with the fundamental tools of
 
1 Investment, and hence the time paths of these variables, would also be
 
affected. Dynamic effects merit attention in the future; but for now, in
 
keeping with a vast literature (much of it reviewed below), only static
 
consequences are analyzed.
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supply and demand. Many, probably most, would go the next step and
 
maintain thet minimum wage laws, collective bargaining over wages, and 
other non-market wage-setting instituti1ons are best eliminated.
 
Xhe analytical starting point for this view is the textbook-level 
diagram of the labor market shown in Figure 1. (See, for example, 
Ehrenberg and Smith (1982)). The labor demand and supply curves-are 
aisumed to have the usual negative and positive slopes respectively. 
Demand and supply generate a market-clearing wage W*and full employment 
Wage
 
S
 
Figure 1. ' -­
Textbook-Level Analysis
 
of Labor Market Effects
 
of a Wage Floor Z
 
I D 
L* L 
The imposition of a wage floor at a level like Wengenders a number 
of effects, all of which are viewed negatively in orthodox analysis: (1) 
Because a wage floor produces negative substitution and scale effects on 
employment, firms move up their labor demand curves and hire less labor. 
Disemployment of L* - L workers results. (2) By virtue of the assumption 
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of an upward-sloping supply of labor curve, the wage floor causes the labor 
force to increase. These additional job aspirants add a further L' - L 
more persons to unemployment. (3) Because of unemployed resources and 
because of the divergence between the wage and the marginal value product 
of the last laborer supplying his/her services in the market, the result is 
economic inefficiency (in the standard sense of the term, i.e., producing 
inside the economy's production possibilities frontier). (4) Because some 
workers end up with higher wages and others with no wages, labor income 
inequality increases. (5) The fact that more workers have zero incomes 
contributes to poverty. This effect might be offset by the gain in wages 
realized by those still working. Whether poverty increasee or decreases 
depends on the sizes of these two effects and on the particular poverty 
measure used. (6) Because the wage differs from what firms would have 
chosen, profits fall. 
Any one of these six consequences---falling employment, rising­
unemployment, economic inefficiency, increased labor income inequality,
 
(possibly) rising poverty, and lower profits---would be enough to turn many
 
economists against an economic policy. When all six result, as in the
 
standard textbook analysis of wage floors, the widespread opposition among
 
economists to wage floors is hardly surprising.
 
What is surprising is that most professional economists align them­
selves on one side of the issue while most development planners, trade
 
unionists, and concerned members of the public align themselves on the
 
other. Is this because economists have figured out the truth and others
 
have not yet caught on? Or because the others know something analytical
 
economists do not? Neither, I think. Rather, when more sophisticated
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analysis has been done, the conclusions of the textbook analysis have been
 
found not to be robust. The only certitude in analyzing the development
 
effects of wage floors is that nothing is certain.
 
Let us turn to some of the sources of thee!' uncertainties.
 
B. Is the Wage Floor Effective?
 
One view about the economics of wage floors is that the whole thing is 
a non-issue. To some observers, the situation depicted in Figure 1---the 
wage persistently exceeding the market-clearing level---would never arise. 
If competition in the labor market is great enough, as some assume, firms 
could not tolerate higher-than-market-clearing wages; they would be driven 
out of business. Minimum wages might not be enforced or complied with. 1 
Trade unions might be ineffectual. 2 If firms are required to pay higher 
money wages, they might cut back on non-wage forms of compensation such as 
fringe benefits, working conditions, employer-provided meals and housing,
 
or training, leaving total compensation unchanged.3 Considerations like
 
these led Milton Friedman (1951) to the position that unions have little or
 
See, for instance, Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) for an econometric analysis
 
of non-compliance in the United States. For the case of Brazil, income
 
distributions are regularly reported under the categories "less'than
 
minimum wage", "one to two minimum wage", etc. Morley (1982, p. 55) for
 
example, reports 54% of Brazilian workers earning less than the minimum.
 
Clearly, coverage and compliance are less than comprehensive.
 
2 	This subject has been extensively studied in the United States. Weiss
 
(1966) concluded that although unionized industries pay higher wages than
 
non-unionized industries, they are able to attract a better grade of
 
workers. lie concludes that the wages received by high-quality workers in
 
the unionized sector are no higher than those received by comparable,
 
non-unionized workers. Most economists reach the opposite conclusion,
 
however. For surveys of studies of the effects of unions on wages, see
 
Johnson (1975) and Parsley (1980).
 
3 	See Welch (1978), Leighton and Mincer (1981), Duncan and Stafford (1980)
 
and Freeman (1981).
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no economic effect; collective bargaining is just a smokescreen in his
 
view, the unions taking credit for wage increases that would have taken
 
place anyhow due to rising productivity of labor and other market forces.
 
Friedman excepted, the Chicago view was and still is that wage-floors 
really do exist. Many of the most significant analysts of the economics of 
minimum wages and of union wage effects---among them, Stigler (1946), Lewis 
(1963), Johnson (1969), Mincer (1976), and Welch (1978)---proudly represent 
the Chicago '. ,l. 
The existence of wage floors in key sectors of developing economics
 
seems clear enough to me. The more significant question is what to make of
 
them.
 
C. Wage Floors Under Monopsony
 
A conclusion from standard textbook analysis is that wage floors
 
reduce employment. But the textbooks also point out that the reverse
 
conclusion may hold under monopsony. That is, the imposition of a wage
 
floor may actually increase employment if the labor market is monopsonis­
tic.
 
The argument goes like this. The monopsonistic firm must pay higher
 
wages whencver it wishes to attract additional laborers. Hence, the labor
 
supply curve to the monopsonist is upward sloping as in Figure 2. Because
 
the firm must ordinarily raise the wages of existing workers whenever it
 
raises the wage to hire new ones, the marginal factor cost curve (MFC) lies
 
above the labor supply curve. The firm hires labor until the marginal
 
factor cost equals the demand for labor (at L*). The firm need not pay a
 
Wage 
MFC 
Figure 2. 
Wage Floor Under 
Monopsony. 0 
W* 
S 
W* D 
!_ 
L* 
__ 
L 
_ _ Labor 
Wage
 
S 
Figure 3 
Wage Floor with 
Unlimited Supplies 
of Labor 
WI 
W0 
W *" "b­
, ,-Labor
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wage as high as WO, though. A sufficient supply of labor is forthcoming if
 
the firm pays a lower wage W*. The profit-maximizing solution un&ar market
 
wage determination is then employment of L* workers at wage W*.
 
Suppose now that a wage floor is imposed at some level W between WO 
and W . The firm must pay that wage to any worker hired. This has two 
effects: it raises the total cost of hiring the first L* workers and it 
lowers the marginal cost of hiring the next (L - L*) workers. As long as 
total factor costs are low enough that the firm can remain in business, it 
is the marginal cost that is relevant to employment decisions. Because the 
marginal cost falls (though the total cost rises), the firm finds it 
advantageous to employ more workers than it had previously. In this way, 
imposition of a wage floor may lead a monosonistic firm to increase 
employment, not reduce it. 
This argument is more than an intellectual curiosum. It delights
 
those observers, particulrrly from *he political left, who sae rampant
 
monopsony in the labor market. Indeed, higher wages for more workers is a
 
lovely idea, especially when the requisite policy instruments (minimum wage
 
laws, legal protection of collective bargaining, etc.) are readily at hand.
 
Among the considerations involved in evaluating the monopsony argument
 
are the prevalence of monopsony and, where monopsony exists, the elasticity
 
of labor supply to the monopsoni3tic firm. I know of no empirical studies
 
in the context of developing countries which address the empirical impor­
tance of monopsony in the labor market. However, the unlimited supply of
 
labor models of Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis (1964), and others are con­
structed on the assumption that modern sector firms are not monopsonistic,
 
in that they can employ more workers simply by hiring them without raising
 
wages. When labor supply is unlimited in the Lewis-Fei-Ranis sense, there
 
is no band within which imposition of a wage floor will raise employment# 
because any wage increase moves the monopsonistic firm backward along its 
labor demand curve. Figure 3 shows this.-

The conditions under which the monopsony argument stands up bear
 
further scrutiny, bath theoretically and empirically. For now, though, the
 
provisional conclusion must be that the monopsony argument is logically
 
valid but of questionable empirical relevance.
 
D. Shock Effects
 
Another favorite of the textbook writers is the possibility of shock
 
effects. The idea is that firms operate with a certain amount of slack,
 
satisficing rather than maximizing. When a wage floor is instituted, firms
 
have a stronger incentive to do things better; they are shocked into being
 
more efficient. Believers in shock effects contend that firms' greater
 
efficiency enables them to afford to hire more labor---conceivably, as in
 
Figure 4, shifting the labor demand curve upward to more than compensate
 
for the wage increase, so that both wages and employment rise (from W* to
 
W and from L* to L respectively).
 
1 Note that in Figure 3 I have drawn the supply of labor curve in the
 
unlimited-supply case as vertical, whereas usually it. is drawn hori­
zontally. Drawing it vertically reflects the definition of a labor supply
 
function, viz., the number of workers who wish to supply their services in
 
a given labor market as a function of the wage. The vertical labor supply
 
curve indicates that the number wishing to supply their services consists
 
of the entire labor force. Employment is determined by the wage rate and
 
the consequent choice of firms where to locate along their '.abor demand
 
curves. The difference between labor supply and labor demand at the
 
preyw ling wage is then the volume of underemployment or unemployment.
 
W
 
Figure 4
 
Possible Shock Effect
 
of a Wage Floor
 
W*
 
D
 
L*!
 
*L
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The shock effect argument presumes inefficiencies; without inefficien­
cies, firma could not be shocked into doing better. The assumption of
 
in.officiexciss runs contrary to the assumption of maximization on which
 
rest both orthodox economics (profit maximization) and radical economics
 
(incessant drive for capital accumulation). It is ironic that many of
 
those who believe most strongly in shock effects are the very same persons
 
who believe most strongly in the insatiable quest of firms for greater
 
wealth.
 
Although one might hope that a higher wage would stimulate enough
 
efficiency to shift firms' demand for labor curves to the right by more
 
than the movement along any given negatively-sloped curve, there seems to
 
be no empirical basis for regarding this outcome as probable. lideed, in a
 
world of multinational corporations and internationally mobile capital, the
 
most likely shock effect of a wage floor is to induce the firm to move out
 
of the economy in pursuit of lower labor costs. I see little empirical
 
merit in the shock effect argument, in developing economies or elsewhere.
 
E. 	Wage Floors and Profit Maximization
 
An interesting theme in the newer theories of labor markets is the
 
possibility that firms might deliberately choose to set their wages higher
 
than market-clearing levels as part of profit-maximizing strategies. As
 
noted by a number of recent writers [e.g., Lazear, 1981; Shapiro and
 
Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof, 1984; and Yellen, 1984], there are a number of
 
possible reasons that firms might do this. Among them are:
 
1. 	Efficiency wage considerations. A worker who is paid
 
more may be more efficient because of better nutrition,
 
improved morale, or heightened self-worth.
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2. Shirking. In a world of imperfect monitoring of job
 
performance, workers may shirk without full detection.
 
Payment of higher wages raises the cost to the worker- of
 
being detected shirking, which presumably induces less
 
of it.
 
3. 	Labor turnover. When workers leave the firm, the firm
 
must incur hiring and training costs. A higher wage cuts
 
down on quits and lessens these costs.
 
4. 	Protection against stochastic elements. In an uncer­
tain world, the firm faces such stochastic factors as
 
unexpected increases in the demand for its product and
 
worker illnesses. Higher wages bring forth a larger
 
labor supply, which can be called upon as needed in
 
response to unanticipated events.
 
5. 	Hiring better quality labor. The higher the wage,
 
the larger and better will be the applicant pool, so the
 
more selective the firm can be in choosing whom to hire.
 
In each case, the driving forca is the same: the firm will pay higher
 
wages if, by doing so, it earns higher profits. For this to happen, not
 
only must labor efficiency increase as wages increase---labor efficiency
 
must increase faster than wages increase. In the terminologyof Johnson
 
(1970), the marginal proportionate increase in efficiency with respect to
 
the wage must exceed the marginal proportionate increase in the wage
 
itself.
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In this class of models, the usual equilibrating forces do not come
 
into play. Ordinarily, with a wage floor, workers would want-'to offer
 
their services and firms would want to employ them at wages below the
 
floor. Wages would tend to fall toward market-clearing levels. But in
 
this class of models, the firm would not accept a worker's offer co be
 
employed at a lower wage, because the worker would be too badly-nouriched
 
to perform effectively, too apt to shirk, or whatever. The firm chooses a
 
wage floor on its own and maximizes its profits by so doing.
 
A wage floor imposed exogenously by an outside body above the wage
 
freely chosen by the firm is very different. If the wage floor is above
 
the level that would have been chosen by the firm, all the usual adverse 
effects (as described in section II.A) pertain. In no way are the negative
 
effects of an exogenously imposed wage floor altered by the newer theories.
 
F. Comments and Evaluation of One-Sector Models
 
The analytical starting point for evaluating wage floors is the
 
textbook model of supply and demand in labor markets. This model predicts
 
a number of adverse consequences of a wage floor: disemployment, higher
 
unemployment, inefficiency, (possibly) higher inequality and poverty, and
 
lower profits.
 
There are some reasons for doubting the textbook view. One argument
 
is that wage floors are more apparent than real. On this view, minimum
 
wages collective bargaining, and other institutional practices simply
 
ratify the wage levels that would have been reached under market forces.
 
This is a very Chicago-esque view. Yet, virtually all Chicago school
 
economists other than Friedman dissent from this position. Another
 
possibility, similar in many respects, arises in the newer views which hold
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that the firm might itself choose a higher-than-market-clearing wage as
 
part of its profit-maximizing drive. In this case, the wage floor may not
 
be binding, because firms might willingly pay wages higher ihan the
 
institutionally-determined floor; but if it is binding, the effects are
 
adverse, just as in the textbook model.
 
There are two logically valid counter-arguments to the textbook model.
 
Under both of them, at least some of the adverse effects of wage floors
 
might be avoided. One mitigating circumstance is the settln- of a wage
 
floor under conditions of monopsony. If the wage floor is set properly,
 
employment can actually increase when a wage floor is imposed. Another
 
countervailing force is shock effects. Imposition of a wage floor might
 
shock a firm into new more efficient production methods. More labor might
 
be hired ae a result. These counter-arguments to the textbook view cannot
 
be ruled out on logical grounds. Rather, their validity is an empirical
 
matter. I am dubious about their empirical relevance.
 
In the balance of this paper, I take the view that wage floors
 
oftentimes are imposed on firms against their will, i.e., firms don't
 
realize sufficP-nt productivity gains from higher wages to have chosen them
 
on their own. This is what the textbook analysis assumes. But unlike the
 
textbook analysis, which is aggregative in nature, it is important also to
 
recognize that some sectors are affected by the wage floor differently from
 
others. The rest of the paper examines the effects of wage floors in
 
two-sector models.
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III. CHOOSING A TWO-SECTOR FRAMEWORK
 
A. Stylized Facts of LDCs' Labor Markets
 
Any realistic analysis of the effects of wage floors in a development
 
setting must capture two empirical features of their labor markets: open
 
unemployment and wage dualism.1 Open unemployment rates, as tabulated
 
by Turnham (1971), Squire (1981), and others are sizable, often in
 
double-digits. And this excludes underemployment, the rates of which are
 
also found to be substantial (Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976; Sabot, 1977;
 
Squire, 1981). Wage dualism arises when apparently homogeneous workers are
 
paid different wages depending on the sector of the economy in which they
 
are employed. Both tabular presentations and multivariate analysis
 
demonstrate wage differentials for observationally-equivalent labor; see
 
Berry and Sabot (1978), Fields (1980), Squire (1981) and the references
 
cited therein. From my reading of this evidence, it appears that after
 
standardizing for relevant differences in workers and firms, there remain
 
wage differences between comparable workers in different sectors.
 
I shall present a model which has both open unemployment and wage
 
dualism and analyze the development effects of a wage floor in such a
 
model. 2 Before proc~eding, though, it is well to remark on the relation­
ship between the models considered below and other classes of rodels which
 
do not capture these two stylized facts.
 
Although not universal, the great majority of developing economies have
 
these characteristics.
 
For analytical convenience, and in keeping with the great bulk of the
 
literature, the model is limited to a single type of labor.
 
2 
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B. Modeld of Wage Floors in a Two-Sector Economy Without Wage
 
Dualism 
These models have two economic sectors with the same wage floor in
 
each. Among this class of models are those of Haberler (1950), Johnson
 
(1965), Brecher (1974a, 1974b), Helpman (1977), Hanson (1983), and Buffie
 
(1984). They present a trading economy with an export sector and an
 
import-competing sector. The wage floor applies uniformly to both sectors.
 
Unemployment results.
 
The principal advantage of this class of models is that the models are
 
of a general equilibrium character. This is an important advantage indeed
 
in examining optimal trade policy in the presence of wage floors. 3ut a 
serious deficiency for our purposes is the lack of a noncovered sector. 
This omits such important empirical features of LDCs' economies as the
 
sector-specificity of minimum wage laws, the differential impacts of trade
 
unions, and so on. The assumption of wage uniformity in these models is
 
inconsistent with the reality of wage dualism. The development effects of
 
minimum wages are more appropriately analyzed in models with wage dualism,
 
to which we now turn.
 
C. Models of Wage Dualism Without Unemployment
 
Models from four fields of economics have the feature of wage dualism
 
but lack unemployment. The empirical fact of unemployment is contradicted
 
by the assumption in these models that unemployment is absent. These
 
models include:
 
i. The dualistic models of economic development. Among these are the
 
well-known classical models of Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964) as
 
well as such neoclassical models as Jorgenson's (1961). The economy
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consists of two sectors payiag different wages from one another. The high
 
wage sector is termed the "manufacturing sector" or the "modern sector"
 
whereas the low wage sector is termed the "agricultural sector" or the
 
"traditional sector." Wages are higher in the manufacturing sector in
 
order to attract a sufficient pool of labor. Lewis, for instance, thought
 
that the urban wage premium would have to be 30% or so if workers were t
 
be drawn away from their villages.
 
For present purposes the key feature of these models is that only two
 
possible labor force situations were assumed: workers were either employed
 
in the modern manufacturing sector or employed in traditional agriculture.
 
Thus, unemployment was ruled out.
 
2. The trade models with fixed wege differentials. Included here are
 
the works of Hagen (1958), Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), and Jones (1971),
 
among others; these and other contributions are surveyed by Magee (1976).
 
These models occupy an important place in trade theory. In these models,
 
it is not the wage in the covered sector that is fixed but rather the wage
 
differential between sectors. This makes sense in some contexts---for
 
example, in creating a sufficient compensating differential in the manu­
facturing sector of an economy to induce workers to leave their familiar
 
surroundings in agriculture. However, for the purpose of analyzing wage
 
floors, such as minimum wages imposed by governments or wage increases
 
negotiated by trade unions, it seems more appropriate to regard the wage in
 
the covered sector as fixed and the wage in the noncovered sector as
 
varying with the movement of labor into or out of the noncovered sector. 
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Accordingly, I regard models with fixed covered sector wage rather than
 
fixed wage differential between covered and noncovered sector as a more
 
fruitful basis for analjsiB of the effects of wage floors.
 
3. Some general equilibrium models of sector-specific wage floors.
 
In this category are Johnson's (1969) model of the general equilibrium
 
effects of minimum wages and Johnson and Mieszkowski's (1970) analysis of
 
the general equilibrium effects of unionization. In these models, the
 
minimum wage or union effectively raises wages in one sector of the economy
 
but not the other, wherein wages are market-determined. Prices adjust to
 
clear goods markets. F'reign trade is excluded from consideration. This
 
meets the objection raised to the previous class of models--that it is the
 
wage differential between sectors and not the wage in the covered sector
 
that is set rigidly. However, a significant problem remains: unemployment
 
is absent. As in the two preceding classes of models, any worker not
 
employed in the high wage sector is assumed to be employed in the low wage
 
sector.
 
4. Some minimum wage models of labor economics.
 
An example is Welch (1974), who maintained that the effect of a wage
 
floor in the covered sector is to shift rightward the supply of labor to
 
the noncovered sector by an amount equal to the disemployment from the
 
covered sector. Once again, we have a model of a wage foor without
 
unemployment.
 
5. A comparison
 
These classes of models differ from one another in ivrortant ways.
 
But despite their differences, these models have one central feature in
 
common: full employment. Open unemployment is assumed away. In all these
 
models, any worker who does not gain employment in the high-paying covered 
sector is assumed to return to the low-paying noncovered sector and find a
 
Job there.
 
Is it rational for workers to do this? This question did not receiV3
 
serious attention by the authors of these models. Perhaps their inatten­
tioni was due to in implicit assumption that nobody could afford to be
 
unemployed for any appreciable length of time; thus, anyone without a
 
high-paying job would take whatever else might be available. Lack of funds
 
to finance a period of job search would justify such an assumption. But
 
subsequent studies of migrants showed that a great many circumvented the
 
lack of a formal capital market by staying with friends and relatives at
 
their destinations, returning home on weekends, and bringing home-grown
 
produce back from their farms with them---in effect, financing their job
 
search through non-cash means.
 
Another justification for assuming away open unemployment surfaced
 
later; see Fields (1975). The number of people unemployed depends in part
 
on their own choices, one aspect of which is the gain to being openly
 
unemployed and searching full time for a high-paying job. If the payoff to
 
job search is high, many people will search and the unsuccessful ones will
 
be unemployed. But if the payoff to job search is low, open unemployment
 
will also be low, because those not hired at high wages will find it more
 
advantageous to accept low wages elsewhere rather than not work at all. A
 
low gain to job search could arise from such disparate causes as nepotism,
 
discrimination, hiring by word of mouth, and job filling through a central
 
employment exchange. If these hiring channels are important enough, and
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job search while unemployed unrewarding enough, workers might rationally
 
decide not to stay unemployed. UnderemDlovment would be widesDread but
 
open unemployment would not.
 
These points should be taken seriously. However, their empirical 
relevance should not be overblown. Open unemployment is a fact and cannot 
be assumed away. Accordingly, the development effects of wage floors are 
best analyzed in models that permit open unemployment. Such models are 
developed below. 1 
D. Models with Wage Dualism and Unemployment
 
Several classes of models have wage dualism and open unemployment.
 
Foremost among them are the models of Harris and Todaro (1970) and Mincer
 
(1976). Wage dualism arises in these and kindred models due to incomplete
 
coverage by minimum wage laws, strong trade unions in some sectors but not
 
others, and the like. Open unemployment arises from the purposeful
 
movement of labor between sectors on the basis of the expected wages in
 
each. Some of these models specify that labor moves on the basis of the
 
strict mathematical expectation (i.e., wage multiplied by probability of
 
employment), while others include the employment probability in some other
 
way. But in all of them, the equilibrium tendency is tcward equalization
 
of wages adjusted for probability of employment. This contrasts with
 
flexible wage models; it is an increase in unemployment in the high wage
 
sectors rather than a fall in the wage that ultimately equilibrates the
 
supply side of the market.
 
An interesting study would be to examine the effects of sector-specific
 
wage floors in models which allow both unemployment and underemployment.
 
(Here, "underemployment" means working at very low pay on the fringes of
 
the covered sector, e.g., in an urban informal sector in a developing
 
economy.) This exercise is left to the future.
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These models with wage dualism and unemployment are more consistent
 
with the stylized facts presented above. The models with which I work
 
below feature expected wage equalization with consequent equilibrium
 
unemployment.
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IV. A TWO-SECTOR MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF WAGE FLOORS
 
A. Introduction
 
The preceding sections contended that a desirable model of wage floors
 
is one in which the wage floor applies to some sectors of the economy but
 
not others and in which unemployment is an outcome. Such a model is
 
developed in the pages below.
 
The strategy I follow is to build a model consistent with sector­
specific wage floors and unemployment that is minimal in complexity and yet
 
reasonable behaviorally and institutionally. The least complex model,
 
though far from simple, is capable of yielding substantial and useful
 
insights. Further refinements--in particular, consideration of wage floors
 
in a dynamic setting and analysis of the welfare economics of the resultant
 
labor force allocations--are deferred until later work.
 
To the extent possible, answers will be sought in general models. At
 
some points, however, the general models yield indeterminte results. This
 
indeterminacy poses a dilemma. Is it due to the difficulty of the problem
 
and inability to discern clear patterns in complex expressions? Or are the
 
results genuinely ambiguous? As I shall show, the indeterminacies arise
 
due to genuine ambiguities, the existence of which 1 demonstrate using two
 
special cases.
 
We shall derive eight results, termed "Propositions" below. Proposi­
tion 1 is that a wage floor generates unemployment. However, which way
 
labor moves cannot be ascertained with certainty. Rather, we shall see that
 
labor will flow into or 
out of the covered sector as that sector's labor
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demand is inelastic/elastic (Proposition 2). Given our concern with the 
employment and unemployment effecti of wage floors, it is natural to ask 
next, "On what does the amount of unemployment depend?" Three determinants
 
will be addressed:
 
i. 	 The elasticity of demand for labor in the
 
covered sector.
 
ii. 	 The elasticity of the wage in the noncovered
 
sector with respect to the size of that sector's
 
labor force.
 
iii. 	 The size of the wage floor itself.
 
As shown by Propositions 3 through 5, the comparative static effects of 
these 	variables are surprisingly ambiguous. Distributional aspects of wage
 
floors also turn out to be less than straightforward; see Propositions 6 
through 8 for effects of wage floors on total wage bill of labor, inccme 
inequality, and absolute poverty respectively. 
These results are derived for the case of a labor force of fixed size,
 
i.e., the wage floor does not change the rate of labor force participation
 
in the economy. Consider what would happen if the labor force participa­
tion rate were allowed to vary. A wage floor increases the wage in some
 
jobs while reducing the number of jobs overall. Would this raise labor
 
force participation or lower it? Additional worker effects and discouraged
 
worker effects would be set into motion, both with respect to the employ­
ment variable and with respect to the wage variable. The net effect on the
 
size of the labor force, and hence on the resultant number unemployed and
 
on other outcome viriables, would be indeterminate. As shown below, a
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number of key results are ambiguous Vven when the labor force participation
 
rate is unchanged. To avoid confounding these ambiguities with those
 
attributable to additional and discouraged worker effects, the balance of
 
this paper assumes a fixed labor force.
 
The results developed below show that 
a key role is played by the
 
elasticity of demand for labor in the economic sectors covered by the wage
 
floor. For an exporting economy engaged in international trade or
 
thinking about engaging in such trade, labor demand may be very elastic 
indeed. Demand for labor is derived from supply and demand for product.
 
If the country is a small open economy, it may have little or no scope to
 
raise the price of its product in response to a wage floor; for if the
 
product price 
were to rise, foreign buyers would buy elsewhere. The only
 
alternative response to a wage floor is to 
cut back production; demand for
 
labor in the covered sector would fall sharply as a result.
 
Interactions between trade policy and labor market policy will be
 
dealt with in a subsequent paper. For now, suffice it to 
say that because
 
many developing economies are 
small in relation to world markets, the
 
results for the elastic demand case may well be the more pertinent ones for
 
analyzing the development effects of wage floors in trading economies.
 
B. Algebraic Representation of the Two Sector Model with
 
Unemployment
 
Suppose a wage floor is imposed on 
some sectors of a developing
 
economy but not 
others. In the model that follows and throughout the
 
subsequent discussion, these two parts of the economy will be referred to
 
as 
the "covered sector" and "noncovered sector" respectively.
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Elementary economic analysis of the type presented in Section II above
 
leads one to expect that employment in the covered sector will fall as a 
result of the wage floor,except in extraordinary circumstances sudi as very
 
large shdck effects. When employment in the covered sector falls, un­
employment will arise unless all of the labor released from the covered
 
sector is absorbed into the noncovered sector.
 
How plausible a circumstance is this? The answer to this question
 
requires a model of the process by which workers choose to allocate
 
themselves between economic sectors.
 
The model I formulate is a single-period one. Expected wage maximi­
zation is the central behavioral postulate. 1 Workers decide between
 
supplying their labor to one sector or the other on the basis of the wages
 
and probabilities of employment in the different sectors. If the expected
 
wage is higher in one economic sector than another, purposeful migration of
 
2
labor will take place. Any temporary differential between expected
 
wages will be eroded as expected wages are brought into balance. Thus,
 
expected wages, not nominal wages, are equalized in equilibrium:
 
E(WC ) - E(WN). () 
(Here, WC and WN respectively denote the wages in the covered and non­
covered sectors and E is the expected value operator.) The expected wage 
in each sector is the wage if employed multiplied by the probability of 
employment. 
1 Implicitly, this assumes that workers are risk-neutral, which means that
 
two possible job opportunities that differ in riskiness but have the same
 
expected value are deemed by workers to be equivalent.
 
2 This basic framework was developed by Harris and Todaro (1970) and
 
Harberger (1971) in the context of rural-urban migration in developing
 
countries.
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Before the imposition of a wage floor, competition in the labor market
 
is assumed to equalize wages in the two sectors at a level denoted by W0 .
 
E workers are assumed to be employed in the covered sector and the re-
C
 
maining L- E O members of the labor force to be employed in the uncovered
 C
 
sector.
 
When the wage floor is imposed, the wage in the covered sector is
 
raised to iC. The employment probability is the ratio of covered sector
 
employment (EC) to covered sector labor force (Lc), including both
 
employed and unemployed. 1 The wage in the non-covered sector WN is
 
non-increasing in the size of that sector's labor force; it adjusts to
 
clear the market, so that the supply of non-covered sector workers equals
 
the demand in that sector. 2 Under these conditions, the equilibrium
 
condition (1) becomes
 
WC --1.-	 (2) 
It is easy to show that the resultant equilibrium is characterized
 
by unemployment. Rewrite the equilibrium condition (2) as:
 
LC 
 WC
 
-	
(2')-VC 	" N 
This specification assumes hiring is probabilistic so that each worker has
 
the same chance of being hired for the available jobs. It also excludes
 
the possibility of on-the-job search.
 
2 	In a special case used in some of the analysis below, the wage in the
 
noncovered sector remains unchanged as workers move into or out of that
 
sector. Even in this case, the labor market clears, in the sense that all
 
workers who supply their labor to the noncovered sectors are employed at
 
the prevailing wage.
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The right hand side is strictly greater than one, because the sector­
specific wage floor has raised the wage in the covered sector above that in
 
the noncovered sector. It follows that in equilibrium, for (2') to hold,
 
the left hand side must also be greater than one; that is, each covered
 
sector job must have more than one Job seeker. Overall, the labor force in
 
the covered sector will be LC workers, of whom 2C will be employed and
 
the remaining LC - 9C will be unemployed. This result is so important 
that it receives a special designation:
 
Proposition 1: A wage floor causes unemployment.
 
Proposition I enables us to answer question posed earlier:a how 
plausible is it that if a wage floor is imposed all of the labor disem­
ployed from the covered sector will be absorbed into the noncovered sector?
 
The answer given for this model is, "Not very." But the reason for this 
answer is different from what might have been thought. It is not that the 
noncovered sector is incapable of employing the labor released by the 
covered sector--indeed, this model assumes that the noncovered sector will 
employ all who seek work there. Rather, it is that the unemployed do not 
seek work in the noncovered sector. This is because if they were all to 
enter the noncovered sector labor force, the expected wage there would be 
lower than the expected 4age in the covered sector. This would not be a 
stable situation. Instead, some of these in the non:overed sector would 
find it advantageous to seek jobs in the covered sector. Some succeed in 
their job search and some do not. The unsuccessful comprise the unemployed 
in equilibrium. 
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As we shall see in Section V, the amount of unemployment generated by
 
a wage floor varies predictably (although rot straightforwardly) with a
 
number of economic variables. But before examining these variations, it is
 
worthwhile to view the preceding model in graphical terms. This graphical
 
formulation will be helpful in deriving the comparative static results
 
presented below.
 
C. 	A Diagrammatic Representation of the Two-Sector Model with
 
Unemploymentl
 
For purposes of analyzing the labor market effects of a wage floor in
 
the two-sector model, the critical question is the division of the labor
 
force between employment in the covered and noncovered sectors and un­
employment. Figure 5 helps determine the equilibrium allocation of the
 
labor force before and after the imposition of a wage floor.
 
Before the wage floor is imposed, the labor force is allocated
 
according to the two curves NN and CC. NN represents the wage-empluyment
 
locus in the noncovered sector. If the predominant mode of labor market
 
organization in that sector is the hiring of workers by firms, then NN is
 
nothing more than the usual demand for labor curve. Alternatively, if the
 
predominant mode of labor market organization in the noncovered sector is
 
self-employment (for instance, in traditional agriculture), NN is still the
 
wage-employment locus, but instead has the interpretation of being the w&ge
 
from self-employment expressed as a function of the number of persons
 
working in that sector. Likewise, when viewed from origin 0', CC is the
 
wage-employment locus in the covered sector. In the covered sector, the 
usual demand-for-labor interpretation holds.
 
1 This representation is due to Corden and Findlay (1975).
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Effect of a Sector-Specific Wage Floor on Labor
 
Force Allocation, Elastic Demand for Labor in
 
the Covered Sector.
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Competition in the labor market tends to equalize wages between the
 
two sectors of the economy. The initial equilibrium allocation of the
 
labor iorce prior to the wage floor is repr,.esented by point A. The wage is
 
0
WO in both sectors. LN workers are employed in the noncovered sedtor and
 
0
 
L in the covered sector. Initially, there is no unemployment, because
C
 
is a market-clearing wage.
 
Suppose now that a wage floor is imposed on the covered sector at a
 
wage WC. Employers in the covered sector move along the labor demand
 
curve CC to a new point X. At that point, they hire 2C workers at the new
 
higher wage. Employment in the covered sector falls.
 
How does the labor force respond? The equilibrium condition given by
 
equation (2) can be represented graphically in the following way. Draw a
 
rectangular hyperbola through the covered sector labor demand point X;
 
denote this hyperbola by P.R. The rectangular area under X represents the
 
total wage bill paid in the covered sector when the wage floor is set at
 
W :
 
Rectangular area under RR at X - WC EC. (3)
 
Look now at the point A where the rectangular hyperbola RR intersects NN,
 
the wage-employment locus in the noncovered sector. The rectangular area
 
under A represents the average wage WN of the Lc persons in the covered
 
sector labor force, 2C of whom are employed and LC - EC of whom are
 
unemployed. Thus:
 
Rectangular area under RR at A WN LC. (4)
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Now, a property of rectangular hyperbolas is that the rectangular area 
under one point is the came as that under any other. So from (3) and (4): 
'PC EC = Q EC. 5) 
But this"is nothing more than a rearrangement of the equilibrium condition
 
(2). Thus, the point A where the rectangular hyperbola RR intersects the
 
noncovered sector wage-employment locus NN depicts the equilibrium alloca­
tion of the labor force between the covered and the noncovered sectors.
 
This information, when combined with the information on covered sector
 
employment at X, theri tells us how many members of the labor force will be
 
employed in the covered sector (EC), employed in the noncovered sector
 
(LN), and unemployed (D) as a result of the wage floor. It also tells us
 
what the resultant wage structure will be ( C and WN)"
 
The existence of unemployment in equilibrium confirms diagrammatically
 
the claim demonstrated algebraically in Proposition 1. This is a general
 
result--that the wage floor results in unemployment.
 
Figure 5 also illustrates some results that are not general. In the
 
figure, the net effect of the wage floor is to move labor from the covered
 
0 c
 
sector (the labor force of which falls from LC to LC) to the noncovered
 
sector (the labor force of which increases from LC0 to L ). The influx of
 
labor into the noncovered sector lowers the wage there from WO to QN"
 
These results are not necessary; all are reversible. Section IV.D shows
 
that the key variable determining which way labor moves is the elasticity
 
of demand for labor in the covered sector.
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D. 	Which Way Does the Labor Force Move When a Wage Floor is
 
Imposed?1
 
A wage floor in the covered sector induces two offsetti --effects on
 
the labor force. The higher wage itself serves as an inducement for labor
 
to enter the covered sector in search of high wage employment. But the
 
higher wage also causes employers in the covered sector to demand fewer
 
workers than before; this loss of employment stimulates movement of labor
 
out of the covered sector. Whether labor on balances moves into the 
covered sector or out of it depends upon the relative strength of these 
opposing effects. 
Early analyses of the pre-formal modeling era made alternate, indeed 
contradictory, assumptions about the direction of the labor force response. 
The minimum wage and union wage effect literatures used to take for 
granted that the decline in employment would move labor out of the covered 
sector, either through direct disemployment or through reduced employment 
growth and lower replacement hiring. As the demand for labor in the 
covered sector fell, workers would move into the noncovered sector. The 
literature on rural-urban migration in less developed countries tended to 
make the opposite assumption: that labor would move into the covered 
sector from the noncovered sector in search DI higher-paying jobs. 
Although employers would not hire as many workers, the fact that the wage 
if employed was higher was taken to imply that more workers would enter the 
covered sector labor force to try to get jobs there. Note that both
 
perspectives recognize that the wage will increase and employment will
 
1 	Mincer (1976) deserves credit for the first thorough analysis of this
 
question, though Harris and Todaro (1970) and Corden and Findlay (1975)
 
both raised the issue earlier.
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decrease in the covered sector. However, one view is that the labor force
 
responds primarily to the loss of jobs in the covered sector, while the 
other is that the primary precipitating factor is the increase in-wages.
 
A more comprehensive view would be one that recognizes that workers
 
respond both to wages in alternative jobs and to the possibilities of
 
securing employment at various wages. A natural way of taking account of
 
both wages and employment is to frame the problem in terms of the wage
 
elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector.
 
If the labor demand elasticity is high, the wage floor would substan­
tially diminish employment. The sharp fall in employment would be expected
 
to provoke a large outflow of labor. The net direction of labor flow in
 
this case would be from the covered sector to the noncovered sector. On the
 
other hand, if the elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector is
 
low, the wage floor would diminish employment only modestly. The combined
 
effect of a large wage increase and a small decline in a number of Jobs
 
would be to stimulate an inflow of job searchers into the covered sector.
 
The net direction of labor flow in this case would be expected to be from
 
the nencovered sector into the covered sector--the opposite direction from
 
the net flow in the highly elastic case.
 
The preceding discussion leads to a dual conclusion: that a sector­
specific wage floor would be expected to shrink the size of the covered
 
sector labor force if the demand for labor in the covered sectir is elastic
 
and to expand the size of the covered sector labor force if the demand for
 
labor in the covered sector is inelastic. Thus, the wage elasticity of
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demand for labor in the covered sector plays a pivotal role in determining
 
the 	ultimate allocation of the labor force, and consequently the amounts of
 
employment and unemployment, resulting from the wage floor.
 
The conclusion that labor on net moves into or out of the covered
 
sector as the demand for labor in thit sector is inelastic or elastic may
 
be shown both algebraically and diagrammatically. Algebraically, the
 
oector-specific wage floor in the covered sector raises the wage by
 
wC -WO
 
S W0 percent. 
 A wage increase of y percent changes employment
 
by n7 percent, where n is the wage elasticity of demand for labor in the
 
covered sector evaluated between W0 and WC. (Note: n is an arc elas­
ticity.) It is hardly controversial to assume that n, the wage elasticity
 
of demand for labor, is negative. It turns out to matter a great deal,
 
though, how negative n is.
 
Suppose the demand for labor in the covered sector is elastic, i.e.,
 
n < - 1. The claim is that labor will move from the covered sector to the
 
noncovered sector as the result of a wage floor. This result may be shown
 
algebraically as follows. The initial equilibrium condition is
 
C 	 EC 0
WC 	 ----
 WN ,
 
LC
 
0 0 
 0 0
 
W= - W and E - L0
where W0 

C N 0 C C
 
The 	new equilibrium is
 
EC
 
C 	 - " N < WNC>c c " 2)
LC 
By definition, W W (1 + 7) and E C Ec (I + ny); as above, y > 0 and
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n < 0. Substituting these into the left hand side of the equilibrium
 
condition (5), we have 
0 
WE ( + y) (1 + ny) 
2)
 S0o (I + 7 + n7 + ny

Now, since r ( -1 and y > 0, then y + n7 ( 0 and n72 < 0. Thus
 
(1+ + n + q72) < I,
 
0
 
from which it follows that WC EC < W0 EC ,i.e., falls when labor
WC EC 

demand is elastic. If the left hand side of (2") falls, so too must the
 
right hand side. This happens if and only if labor moves out of the
 
covered sector.' We may thus conclude that an elastic demand for labor
 
in the covered sector implies that a wage floor will on balance move labor
 
out of the covered sector.
 
The case of an elastic demand for labor is the case depicted in Figure
 
5 above. Observe that the curve CC is flatter than the curve RR at point
 
X. This means that the demand for labor in the covered ector is more
 
elastic than the rectangular hyperbola. Now, since rectangular hyperbolas
 
have unitary elasticity, it follows that: the demand for labor in the
 
covered sector must be elastic between A and X. In the elastic case, the
 
rectangular hyperbola RR cuts the noncovered sector wage-employment locus
 
a) Proof of if part: If labor moves out of the covered sector, LC falls
 
and LN rises. When LN rises, WN falls. Therefore, WIL C falls when labor
 
moves out of the covered sector.
 
b) Proof of only if part: If labor moveA into the covered sector, LC
 
risos and LN falls. The fall in LN causes WN to rise, so WNLC rises. This
 
contradicts the original condition, establishing the only if part.
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NN to the right of the initial intersection, i.e., A lies to the right of
 
X. Thus, the new equilibrium occurs with more labor in the noncovered
 
sector and less in the covered sector, as was to be shown.
 
The case of inelastic demand for labor in the covered sector proceeds
 
in parallel fashion. The key result is that the wage floor will induce
 
labor to move on balance from the noncovered sector j.nto the covered
 
sector. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 6, in which the
 
inelastic demand for labor in the covered sector CC appears as a very steep
 
curve and the rectangular hyperbola RR cuts the noncovered sector wage­
employment locus NN to the left of the initial intersection.
 
Tying together the results of this section, we have seen that the
 
imposition of a sector-specific wage floor will result in unemployment.
 
However, the direction of labor force movement depends on the elasticity of
 
demand for labor in the covered sector as follows:
 
Proposition 2:
 
A sector-specific wage floor induces movement of
 
labor out of the covered sector if the demand for labor in
 
the covered sector is elastic and into the covered sector
 
if the labor demand is inelastic.
 
An important implication of Proposition 2 is that analyses that assume that
 
labor flows in one direction or the other will be in error. Consequently,
 
we will work with the elastic and inelastic cases separately in the sequel.
 
As it turns out, some key results are exactly reversed for the two cases,
 
so the distinction is an important one indeed.
 
R 
C 
N 
wx 
W 0 
.R A 
INNL 
I.I 
H-Lc
 
Figure 6.
 
Effect of a Sector-Specific Wage Floor on Labor Force
 
Allocation, Inelastic Demand for Labor in the Covered
 
Sector
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E. Special Cases of the Two-Sector Model
 
Section V develops the comparative statics of the two-sector model.
 
Some results are derivable in general and some are not. 
 For those that are
 
not, the comparative statics are ambiguous. 
These ambiguities are best
 
demonstrated using two models which 
are special cases of the general model
 
we have worked with up to now.
 
Model I makes a special simplifying assumption: that the wage in the
 
noncovered sector, while continuing to be market-clearing, is invariant
 
with respect to the size of that sector's labor force. This could arise in
 
the following circumstance. Imagine a dualistic economy with a modern
 
manufacturing sector and 
a traditional agricultural sector. The wage floor
 
applies to the modern manufacturing sector only, as in the Lewis-Fei-Ranis
 
and Harris-Todaro types of models. 
The assumption of a constant wage in
 
the novcovered sector might be realistic if a) land is abundant, so that
 
anyone who wants 
can find a plot of land, till it, and earn the same amount
 
as is 
earned by others already in the traditional sector, and/or b) the
 
covered sector is small in relation to the noncovered sector, so that in
 
the relevant range, such inflows outflows of labor as occur leave the
or 
wage in that sector effectively unchanged. In Model I, the wage in the 
noncovered sector is constant and given by: 
WN(LN) - WN - WO. (6)
 
This simplifying assumption has been made by Fields (1975), Anand and Joshi
 
(1979), and Stiglitz (1982), among others.
 
Model II makes a different simplifying assumption: that total product
 
in the noncovered sector does not 
change with the size of that sector's
 
labor force--a classic labor surplus situation. As in the surplus labor
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literature, suppose that labor in the noncovered sector is paid its average
 
product. Denote the total fixed output in the noncovered sector by ?QN"
 
Then, setting the wage equal to the average product, in Model 1I-

WN LN (6")
 
These two cases effectively bound the economically meaningful posei­
bilities. The reasoning is follows.
as It is hard to imagine that the
 
wage in the noncovered sector might rise if labor moves into that sector 
or 
fall if labor moves out. For this to happen, the production function would 
have to exhibit increasing returns---hardly a likely circumstance for the 
low-income sector of an economy. Constant returns is thus one boundary 
value. On the other hand, it is equally hard to imagine that total product 
in the noncovered sector would vary inversely with the size of that
 
sector's labor force. This would require a production function with
 
negative returns---also an unlikely circumstance. Zero returns is thus the
 
other boundary value. Thus, the normal situation--production under
 
positive but diminishing returns--is bounded by a constant positive
 
marginal product (Model I) and zero marginal product (Model II).
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V. 	UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE TWO-SECTOR MODEL: COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS
 
This.section develops the relationship between the equilibrium amount
 
of unemployment in the two-sector model and three parameters of interest:
 
A. 	Elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector
 
B. 	Elasticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with respect
 
to the noncovered sector labor force
 
C. Size of the wage floor
 
It turns out that for none of these parameters is the comparative static
 
effect unidirectional.
 
A. Elasticity of Demand for Labor in the Covered Sector
 
When a wage floor of given size is imposed, will there be more
 
unemployment in an economy when the demand for labor in the covered sector
 
is highly elastic or when it is less elastic? Two lines of reasoning might
 
be invoked.
 
Those familiar with the standard textbook labor market model of a wage
 
floor might draw two demand curver for labor in the covered sector, shown
 
as D'D' and D"D" in Figure 7; they start out at the same place at the
 
market-clearing wage WO, but curve D"D" is more elastic than curve D'D'.
 
The more elastic the demand for labor in the covered sector, the less
 
employment there, the greater the gap between the quantities of labor
 
supplied (as given by SS) and demanded, and thus the more unemployment
 
there will be in this model.
 
Those familiar with two-sector models might think of it differently.
 
Start with the equilibrium condition
 
w
w 	 E = (2)
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Possible Effect uf a More Elastic Demand for Labor in
 
the Covered Sector, for a Stationary Labor Supply Curve
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and rewrite it as
 
EC WN
 
C N 
 (2''')
 
Tfio-sector reasoning might lead one to think that the more elastic is the
 
demand for labor, the less employment there will be in t e covered sector
 
after the imposition of a wage floor. If EC, the numerator of the left
 
hand side, falls, tihe denominator LC must also fall so as to keep the same
 
ratio WN/WC. If tbo ratio of employment to labor force remains the same in
 
tLe covered sector, but if covered sector employment and hence covered 
sector labor force are smaller when the demand for labor is more elastic, 
the difference between them will also be smaller. And since this differ­
ence between labor force and employment in the covered sector is the amount
 
of unemployment in the econrmy, this line of reasoning might lead one to 
conclude that unemployment will be smaller the more elastic is demand for 
labor in the covered sector.
 
Alas, something is amiss. These two lines of reasoning have led to
 
contradictory conclusions. The first line of reasoning leads 
one to
 
believe that the more elastic demand for 
labor would result in more
 
unemployment while the second concludes that 
a more elastic demand for
 
labor would result in lees unemployment. Which is right? The answer is
 
that both are partially right and partially wrong.
 
The first analysis is right in assuming that a more elastic demand
 
curve implies less employment. But the analysis reaches an unambiguous
 
conclusion only by assuming that the supply of labor curve remains sta­
tionary if fewer jobs are available. However, the supply curve would not
 
be expected to stay put. This is because the number of workers willing to
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supply their services to the covered sector at 3ny given wage decreases the
 
fewer jobs there are, i.e., the supply curve shifts leftward. The smaller
 
the number of jobs, the larger the shift. This in illustrated in-Figure 8.
 
In the diagram, supply curve S' corresponds to demand curve D' and S" to 
D". If the supply curve of labor shifts leftward by more than the leftward
 
rotation of the demand curve, unemployment decreases; otherwise, it
 
increases. 
 By ignoring the shift of the supply curve, the diagrammatic
 
analysis of Figure 7 is in error.
 
The second analysis (i.e., the two-sector model including equation
 
(2''')) is right in concluding that a more elastic demand for labor will
 
result in less unemployment if the ratio of wages in the two sectors
 
remains constant. In general, though, the ratio will not remain constant,
 
because labor will move from one sector to another, causing the wage in the
 
noncovered sector to change accordingly. A more comprehensive analysis is 
needed.
 
One way of performing the more comprehensive analysis is to use the
 
diagrammatic representation of the labor force allocation. 
The necessary
 
diagrams appear as Figures 9 and 10, for the cases of elastic and inelastic
 
labor demand respectively. In both diagrams, the more elastic labor demand
 
curve is represented as a flatter curve rotated through the 
initial
 
allocation A. The initial allocation of the labor fore is denoted without
 
superscripts, the allocation for the less elastic labor demand curve by
 
prime superscripts, and the more elastic labor demand curve by double-prime
 
superscripts.
 
In both cases, the more elastic labor demand curve generates less
 
employment for any given wage floor WC , i.e., E< E' Ec. 
In the case
 
of an elastic demand for labor in the modern sector (Figure 9), LN increases
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Figure 8.
 
Possible Effect of a More Elastic Demand for Labor in
 
the Covered Sector, for a Shifting Labor Supply Curve.
 
46 
R' 
N R 
Figure 9. 
Effect of More Elastic 
Demand for Labor inC 
the Covered Sector When 
the Demand for Labo-r is 
Elastic 
WC 
w0 
0A 
N 
C R RI 
" 
I I 
I 
IL 
I C "-" 
L-" +U" -- E I 
RlR" 
N CI'1 
Figure 10. 
Effect of More Elastic 
Demand for Labor in the 
Covered Sector When the 
Demand for Labor is 
Inelastic 
C 
W0 
RA-' 
-
L' 
LN 
C-1 N 
L 
E-c' 
EC 
J 
A 
47 
and LC decreases. The decrease in LC is larger the more elastic is the de­
mend for labor in the modern sector, i.e., L ( . " < L' and
L< Since 

and " E' , the respective unemmployment figures U" - L" - Ell ahd U' -
C . C C 
L - El.cannot be compared on this basis alone. For the case of an in­
elastic demand for labor in the modern sector (Figure 10), a similar
 
indeterminancy appears in the diagrams. 
 In this case, LN decreases and LC
 
( - E + U) increases. The increase in LC is smaller the more elastic is
 
the demand for labor in the modern sector, i.e., L' > L" L . Once again,
C C C
 
since El ( E' and L" < L , the unemployment figures U" - L" - El and U' =
' 

C C 
- ECC
L C- EC and U' LC'C- ' cannot be compared on this basis alone. Thus, 
Thus, the diagrammatic method has proven incapable of determining whether,
 
in response to a wage floor of a given size, a greater elasticity of demand
 
for labor in the covered sector results in more unemployment or less
 
unemployment in equilibrium.
 
In actuality, the diagrammatic method is inconclusive for good reason:
 
both outcomes are possible. I shall now demonstrate this.
 
A more elastic demand for labor in the covered sector results in less
 
unemployment in the following circumstance. Take the special case referred
 
to as Mode. I above, in which WN is constant regardless of the size of the
 
noncovered sector labor force. Then, WN/Wc 
is the same as WN/WC. 
Write unemployment in Model I explicitly as 
._W_ I 0 
U- (W - 1) Ec - E (1 + ny). 
For a given Ec (initial employment in the covered sector) and r (wage
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increment due to the wage floor), the more elastic is the demand for labor
 
in the covered sector, the more negative is q in this model, and so the 
less unemployment there will be. This example suffices to-prove the
 
possibility that a more elastic demand for labor might be associated with
 
less unemployment.
 
The opposite possibility--that a more elastic demand for labor might
 
result in more unemployment--may also be demonstrated by means of an
 
example. Take the special case represented by Model II, in which labor in
 
the noncovered sector is paid its average product and total output in that
 
sector is fixed, i.e., WN - - . As before, denote the results for the
N LN
 
less elastic demand curve by prime superscripts and the results for the
 
more elastic demand by double-primes. For the less elastic demand, the
 
equilibrium condition is
 
LC CcEc
WC - <-> -K ,where K - (7)
CLC LN LN 
 Q
 
Manipulation of (7) yields an equilibrium volume of unemployment
 
K' -

U' - L' - E, lK' L , .1
 C C +K'C
 
By analogy,
 
1
 
LCC KL - K' < > L'L - -L c -> K'' K'<= K'
 
LN L-L' C
 
S+K' LC K' K' ­
--m -- C __ 
L K' + K' <1> 1+K' LC > l+K' L
 
U' - L' - E'U - K' L- - E'.l+K' Q.E.D.
 
U"l " -E"l 7+ L -E" where K CC C C +K" CN 
The difference between the two unemployment amounts is given by
 
U" K' - K"
 
() L El- (-X) L + E"
I+Kl C IKC
 
(K'- K") L (E' - E")
 
(I+K") (I+K') C
 
WE' E(E-
 El)- (E " 
1 + + CCC (8)cc+ 

The term (Ed- E") is positive, because the prime term corresponds to the
 
less elastic labor demand curve, for which employment is greater. Suppose
 
that for certain parameter values, the term in curly braces is less than
 
one. Then the first term on the right hand side of (8) will be less
 
positive than the second term is negative and therefore the whole expres­
sion will be negative. U' - U" < 0 implies U" > U', i.e., unemployment is 
greater for the more elastic labor demand curve. 
The requisite parameter values can be found by establishing conditions
 
under which the denominator of the term in curly brackets exceeds
 
the numerator. A sufficient condition for this to hold is
 
'
WE' WE"c WcL
 
+ > WC 

(9)
 
(This is sufficient because the other terms in the denominator are also
 
positive.) Condition (9) is simply that E' + E" > L
 
CC
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Is this permissible? An example will show that it is. Assume the
 
following initial conditions:
 
L -l000
 
0 0E C L~ - 7L -700 
o o
 
L - L' - 300
N C 
QNw 300
 
W0 - I.
 
The wage in each sector is 1 and employment is full, so this is an
 
equilibrium labor force allocation by (2). Suppose now that a wage floor
 
is imposed in the covered sector 10% above the original equilibrium, i.e.,
 
WC M I.I. Under the less elastic labor demand curve, covered sector
 
employment is assumed to fall from 700 to 600, and under the more elastic
 
situation, from 700 to 500. The labor force allocation under the less
 
elastic situation is given by
 
S K'-L - CE 1 QN 660/300 2.2LC +K l+K E /- 1 + 660/3 1,000 - 3.2 1,000 687.5,
 
C+C 
 1,000
 
' L - L' " 1,000 - 687.5 - 312.5,
 
and U'- L' - E' - 687.5 - 600 - 87.5; 
under the more elastic situation, the equilibrium allocation is
 
K" C
 - QN - 550300"
LC" I+K" L E0 1,000 - 647,
1 + 550/300
1+WC QN 

- L - L" - 1,000 - 647 353,N C 
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and U" - L" - E" - 647 - 500 - 147.C C C 
Summarizing the respective outcomes:
 
New Situation When Demand for
 
Labor in Covered Sector is:
 
Less More
 
Originally Elastic Elastic
 
Employment in Covered Sector (E ) 700 600 500
 
Labor Force in Covered Sector (L ) 700 687.5 647
 
Labor Force in Noncovered Sector (LN ) 300 312.5 353
 
Unemployment (U) 87.5
0 147
 
To check that these are indeed characterized by expected value equalization
 
in the two sectors, note that
 
E' 600 300
 
WC CL"' C - 1.1 687.5 - .96 - 312.5 - -L'
 
EC 500 300 N 
and WC--r- -. 1 67 .850 3 
C 5N 
Observe that the more elastic demand for labor in the covered sector is
 
associated with more unemployment, as was to be shown.
 
In sum, we set out in this section to investigate whether, when a wage
 
floor of a given amount is imposed, a greater elasticity of demand for
 
labor in the covered sector results in more unemployment or less. The
 
answer that has been reached is that both outcomes are possible. This may
 
be summarized as:
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Proposition 3: For any given wage floor and for
 
any given elasticity of wage in the noncovered sector
 
with respect to the size of that sector's labor force:
 
(a) A greater elasticity of demand for labor in the
 
covered sector may result in less unemployment.
 
(b) A greater elasticity of demand for labor in the
 
covered sector may result in more unemployment.
 
B. 	Elasticity of the Wage in the Noncovered Sector With Respect to
 
the Noncovered Sector Labor Force
 
Suppose a wage floor of a given amount is imposed on the covered
 
sector of an economy and suppose a given demand response in the covered
 
sector. Another comparative static question of interest concerns the
 
responsiveness of the wage in the noncovered sector to changes in the size
 
of that sector's labor force. That wage may change with that sector's
 
labor force in either of two circumstances: a) when employers in that
 
sector have downward-oloping labor demand curves, or b) when the sector
 
consists of self-employed workers whose marginal products are smaller than
 
their average products. The question to be asked is: when will the
 
unemployment resulting from the wage floor be higher--when the wage in the
 
noncovered sector is relatively elastic or relatively inelastic with
 
respect to the size of the noncovered sector labor force? The answer, it
 
turns out, is that it depends; either more unemployment or less is pos­
sible.
 
What the comparative static result depends on is whether the demand
 
for labor in the covered sector is elastic or inelastic. The rationale for
 
thAis conclusion goes as follows.
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Suppose the demand for labor in the covered sector is sufficiently 
inelastic that in response to the wage floor, workers are moving out of the
 
noncovered sector in pursuit of high-paying jobs in the covered sector.
 
Out-movement will be greatest when the wage in the noncovered sector is
 
invariant with respect to the number of workers in that sector. But if, as
 
labor starts to move ou,; of the noncovered sector, the wage increases
 
there, then the gain from moving decreases and fewer people will do so.
 
Unemployment rises by less as a result. Thus, when the net flow of labor
 
is into the covered sector, the size of that flow and the consequent amount
 
of unemployment in equilibrium would bcch be expected to be smaller the
 
more elastic is the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size
 
of that sector's labor force.
 
Alternatively, if the demand for labor in the covered sector is
 
elastic, workers will move out of the covered sector into the noncovered
 
sector. The most movement, and hence the least unemploymunt, will occur
 
when the wage in the noncovered sector is invariant with respect to the
 
number of workers in that sector. But if the wage starts to fall as
 
workers move in, the gain from moving decreases and fewer people will move.
 
Unemployment is greater as a result.
 
Overall, then, the unemployment response is expected to be flatter the
 
more responsive is the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to that
 
sector's labor force. This claim will now be demonstrated both diagram­
matically and algebraically.
 
Figures 11 and 12 depict the cases of inelastic and elastic demands
 
for labor in the covered sector respectively. In both diagrams, the demand
 
for labor in the. covered sector is represented by the CC curve and the
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initial market-clearing equilibrium by A. The case of a wage in the
 
noncovered sector that is invariant with respect to the size of that
 
sector's labor force is 
represented by the less elastic wage-employment
 
locus N'N' through A. A more elastic wage-employment locus in the non­
covered sector appears as N"N", also passing through A.
 
Take first the case of an inelastic demand for labor in the covered
 
sector (Figure 11). When a wage floor is imposed at level WC' employ­
ment is reduced from LC to EC. In this case, the rectangular hyperbola RR
 
through the relevant point X on the demand curve cuts the demand for labor
 
curve 
CC from the northeast, and thus intersects the wage-employment locus
 
to the left of the original intersection. Thus, as established earlier in
 
Proposition 2, when the demand for labor in the covered sector is inelas­
tic, this wage floor induces movement of labor into the covered sector. For
 
the two wage-employment loci N'N' and N"N", the respective equilibrium
 
allocations are A' and A". Both entail unemployment. Of interest for the
 
comparative static analysis is the fact that the equilibrium for the less
 
elastic noncovered sector wage-employment locus N'N' entails more unemploy­
ment in this case. This is because more labor will move into the covered
 
sector, and hence unemployment will be greater, if the wage in the non­
covered sector is constant as people move out of it than if the wage in the
 
noncovered sector increases as people move out.
 
The case of an elastic demand for labor in the covered sector may be
 
analyzed similarly; see Figure 12. Once gain, the imposition of a wage
 
floor at level WC reduces employment from LC to EC Now, however,
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because the demand for labor in the covered sector CC ir elastic, the
 
rectangular hyperbola through the relevant point X on the demand curve cuts
 
the noncovered sector wage-employment locus to the right of tI& original 
i-ntersection, i.e., labor moves out of the covered sector into the non­
covered sector. For the less elastic wage-employment locus in the non­
covered sector, the new equilibrium id at A'; for the more elastic, at A". 
This shows that more labor will move out, and hence unemployment will be 
smaller, if the wage in the noncovered sector stays unchanged as people 
move in than if the wage in the noncovered sector decreases as people move 
in. Thus, the less elastic noncovered sector wage-employment locus entails 
less unemployment. 
The dependence of the comparative static result on the elasticity of
 
demand for labor in the covered sector may be demonst:ated algebraically by
 
comparing the two special cases referred to as Models I and II above.
 
Model I has constant per capita wage in the noncovered sector and Model II
 
constant total wage bill in the noncovered sector. Unemployment amounts in
 
the two cases are given by
 
"- - E c (10) 
in Model I and
 
LIII W 
U L -E E ,lc \ ,c Q/L" (11;CC N - QN N 
I
in Model II. Form (10) and (11), it is seen that UI > UII as W 

, 0> N
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i.e., if in Model II, the wage in the noncovered sector is
 
greater/same/lowez than initially. And since, in Model II, the noncovered
 
sector wage is greater/same/lower than initially as the noncovert4 sector
 
rabor force is smaller/same/greater than initially, aiid since the non­
covered sector labor force is smaller/same/greater than initially as the
 
demand for labor in the covered sector is inelastic/unitary elastic/elas-

UII 
tic, it follows that UI as the demand for labor in the covered
 
sector is inelastic/unitary elastic/elastic.
 
In sum, the preceding analysis has shown that the more responsive is
 
The noncovered sector wage with respect to the size of that sector's labor
 
force, the more moderate is the response of unemployment to the wage floor.
 
This may be summed up as:
 
Proposition 4. For any given wage floor and for any given
 
elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector: (a) If
 
the demand for labor in the covered sector is elastic, then
 
the more elastic is the wage in the noncovered sector with respect
 
to the size of that sector's labor force, the higher is un­
employment; (b) if the demand for labor in the covered sector
 
is inelastic, then the more elastic is the wage in the noncovered
 
sector with respect to the size of that sector's labor force, the
 
lower is unemployment.
 
Thus, the responsiveness of the wage in the noncovered sector to the size
 
of that sector's labor force acts as a leveling influence, reducing the
 
amount of unemployment when that sector's labor force is increasing and
 
increasing unemployment when that sector's labor force is decreasing. To
 
the best of my knowledge, the interactive nature of this comparative static
 
result has not appeared previously in the literature.
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C. Size of the Wage Floor
 
What is the effect of a higher wage floor on the volume of unemploy­
ment in equilibrium? The standard supply-demand diagram, shown in Figure
 
13, yields an unambiguous answer: more unemployment.
 
By now, it should not be too surprising to be told that the textbook
 
answer is not necessarily correct. It would be correct if, when the wage
 
floor rises, the quantity of labor demanded falls and the quantity of labor
 
supplied to the covered sector rises. The quantity of labor supplied to
 
the covered sector rises if the demand for labor in the covered sector is
 
inelastic; cf. Proposition 2. The diagrammatic analysis contained in
 
Figure 14 shows that a highe: wage floor in the covered sector (WC)
 
results in more unemployment than does a lower wage floor (W') when the
 
C
 
demand for labor in the covered sector is inelastic.
 
Suppose, however, that the demand for labor in the covered sector is
 
elastic. Then, when the wage floor is higher, both the quantity of labor
 
demanded and the quantity of labor supplied are reduced. The diagrammatic
 
analysis of Figure 15 is inconclusive--it appears that unemployment might
 
either increase of decrease. Indeed both outcomes are possible.
 
To illustrate the ambiguity of the outcome, consider the special case
 
in which the wage in the noncovered sector is invariant with respect to the
 
size of that sector's labor force (Model I). The equilibria for the two
 
wage floors are given by
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Figure 13.
 
Textbook Analysis of Effect of Higher Wage Floor.
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W' Ec
 
-w
 
and " 
-. W" E"
C
cc-

Here, W c and W"C are the two wage floors (W < W"), E' and E c the
C a C
 
corresponding covered sector employment levels, and L' and LC the cor­
responding covered sector labor forces.
 
Unemployment in the two cases is
 
W' E'
 
UP - C - El

C
 
N
 
W" El
 
and U" - C C -E
 
C
 
WN
 
The difference between them is
 
wit WI
C - "- ( C - 1) '
 
WN 
 WN
 
This difference is negative, and hence a higher wage floor results in less
 
unemployment if
 
WL
 
C
 
WC N
 
An example suffices to illustrate the possibility of condition (12).
 
Suppose -- -2 and - - 3. Then the right hand side of (12) equals 
WN 
 WN
 
2-1 1
 
3-1 2
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The condition for unemployment to fall when the wage floor rises is that
 
1
 
the left hand side of (12) be less than . Suppose therefore that
-
2"- uppse hereoretha 
E- AE and El - . 3EC, where E is employment in the cove:ed sector priorC C C C 
- 31
 
to imposition of the wage floor. Thus, EC 8
 
and therefore satisfies the condition. We thus expect to find lower
 
unemployment for the higher wage floor. Indeed we do:
 
U' - (2-1) .8E - .8E for W' - 2WNC C C N 
and U" - (3-1) .3E - 6E for W" - 3WC C C N 
The higher wage floor (3 as opposed to 2) is associated here with less
 
unemployment (A6E0versus .8E0.
 C C 
Summing up, we have:
 
Proposition 5. (a) A higher wage floor may result in
 
more unemployment in equilibrium. (b)A higher wage
 
floor may result in less unemployment in equilibrium.
 
D. Summary of Comparative Static Results
 
A two-sector labor market model has been constructed. One sector is
 
covered by a wage floor and one is not. In this model, the wage floor
 
creates unemployment. The amount of unemployment has been shown in this
 
section to depend upon three parameters af interest in the following ways:
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*For any given wage floor and for any given
 
elasticity of wage in the noncovered sector with
 
respect to the size of that sector's labor force:
 
(a) A greater elasticity of demand for labor in the
 
covered sector may result in less unemployment.
 
(b) A greater elasticity of demand for labor in the
 
covered sector may result in more unemployment.
 
*For any given wage floor and for any given
 
elasticity of demand for labor in the covered
 
sector: (a) If the demand for labor in the covered
 
sector is elastic, then the more elastic is the wage
 
in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of
 
that sector's labor force, the higher is unemploy­
ment; (b) If the demand for labor in the covered
 
sector is inelastic, then the more elastic is the
 
wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the
 
size of that sector's labor force, the lower is
 
unemployment.
 
*(a) A higher wage floor may result in more
 
unemployment in equilibrium. (b) A higher wage
 
floor may result in less unemployment in equili­
brium.
 
A remark is in order on the relation between the results derived here
 
and those in the previous literature. The text of the seminal contri­
bution of Harris and Todaro (1970) and their accompanying Figure 1 stated
 
their expectation that a higher wage floor would result in movement of
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labor into the covered sector (the modern manufacturing sector) from the 
noncovered sector (rural agriculture), and that consequently the higher the
 
wage floor, the more unemployment there would be in equilibfium. The
 
typical reader might naturally have been inclined to have regarded this
 
conclusion as derived unambiguously from theoretical reasoning. But a more
 
careful reading reveals that the unequivocal conclusion was based on
 
empirical evidence---in particular, the findings of Katz (1968), Eriksson
 
(1969), and Harris and Todaro (1969) that labor demand in developing
 
countries is inelastic. However, Harris and Todaro's footnotes 10 and 11
 
recognized the alternative theoretical possibilities. They noted that the
 
direction of movement of the labor force depends on the elasticity of
 
demand for labor in the covered sector and also on price changes. They
 
also noted that if the demand for labor in the covered sector is suffi­
ciently elastic, a higher wage floor might actually lower unemployment; in
 
this case, they correctly observed: "Unemployment will result from the
 
imposition of a minimum wage but we can no longer assert that the level of
 
unemployment will increase concomitantly with the level of the minimum
 
wage." The possibility that unemployment might decrease is demonstrated in
 
Proposition 5 above.
 
Mincer (1976) observed that a wage floor would create unemployment.
 
Among his comparative static results was the claim that a wage floor will
 
have a small effect on unemployment the smaller is the elasticity of demand
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for labor in the covered sector. This claim is not necessarily correct. 
Indeed, Proposition 3 demonstrates that the reverse relationship is also 
pqssible6 
Corden and Findlay's (1975) treatment of the two-sector model with 
unemployment did not perform comparative statics on 
the unemployment rate.
 
1 Mincer reaffirmed this claim in private correspcndence with me.
 
66 
VI. 	 OTHER DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS OF WAGE FLOORS
 
Until now, we have focused on the employment and unemployment effects
 
of wage floors. Also of interest, though, is the matter of income distri­
bution effects. We shall examine the effect of the wage floor on three
 
aspects of income distribution: total wages paid to labor, size distribu­
tion of labor income, and extent of absolute poverty. 1 We shall also
 
address wage floors and economic efficiency.
 
A. 	Effects of Wage Floors on Total Wage Bill
 
Analysts concerned with income distribution frequently are interested
 
in thi effects of a policy on labor's total income. Often, this is
 
compared with the effects of the policy on the incomes of capitalists,
 
landowners, and other groups. 
 This result is the functional distribution
 
of income and its change over time.
 
The models developed above yield information on incomes received form
 
labor but not from other sources. Consequently, we are limited here to a
 
consideration of total wages alone which, in the terminology of labor
 
economics, shall be called the "wage bill."
 
It may be shown that a wage floor can move the wage bill in any
 
direction. The total wage bill (WB) is the wage in each sector multiplied
 
by the corresponding level of employment:
 
WB - WCEC + WNLN. (13)
 
The equilibrium labor force allocation is given by the familiar
 
relationship
 
1 Technical note: The measures that follow are defined on the space of
 
actual incomes, not expected incomes. This is the customary thing to do.
 
It is 	also not inconsequential.
 
Ec. W (2) 
we derive
Combining (13) and (2), 

from which it is seen that the following effects of 
a sector-specific wage
 
floor are possible:
 
Proposition 6:
 
The total wage bill will rise if the wage floor moves
 (a) 

people out of the noncovered sector and those who remain
 
This happens if i) the demand for labor
 receive a higher wage. 

the elasticity of the
 in the covered sector is inelastic and ii) 

wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the noncovered
 
sector labor force is nonzero.
 
The total wage bill will fall if the wage floor moves
 (b) 

people into the noncovered sector and the wage falls 
there.
 
This happens if i) the demand for labor in the covered sector
 
is elastic and ii) the elasticity of the wage in the non­
covered sector with respect to the noncovered sector 
labor
 
force is nonzero.
 
The total wage bill will be unchanged if the wage
(c) 

in the noncovered sector does not change when a wage 
floor is
 
This happens if the elas­imposed in the covered sector. 

ticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with respect
 
zero.
 to the noncovered sector labor force is 

as a measure of income
 
Thus, if the wage bill paid to labor is taken 

a wage floor on that measure cannot be
 effects of
distribution, the 

It depends on a particular economy's circumstances.
 determined a priori. 

Functional income distribution
 One cautionary remark should be made. 

this ignore the distribution of incomes within a func­measures such as 

If the total wage bill increases, that does not mean 
that
 
tional category. 
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all workers benefit. Those who are unemployed as a result of a wage floor
 
or who are crowded into low-paying jobs in the noncovered Gector are worse
 
off even if total labor income is increasing.
 
For this reason, I prefer to use income distribution measures that
 
reflect the distribution of incomes among persons in the labor force rather
 
than looking just at aggregate labor income. Two classes of measures are
 
available for this purpose: measures of relative income inequality and
 
measures of absolute poverty.
 
B. Effects of Wage Floors on Relative Income Inequality
 
Relative inequality is customarily measured by Lorenz curves like
 
those shown in Figure 16 and Lorenz-curve-based indices. Imposition of a
 
wage floor has a clear effect on tne inequality of labor incomes.
 
In the absence of a wage floor, workers in the two sectors of an
 
economy are paid the same wage. There is thus no inequality in the
 
distribution of labor incomes. This fact is represented by a Lorenz curve
 
coincident with the 45U line.
 
When a wage floor is imposed on the covered sectors of an economy and
 
not on others, that fact alone creates labor income inequality. But in
 
addition, the wage floor also results in unemployment. That unemployment,
 
with consequent zero incomes for those individuals, contributes further to
 
income inequality. Three income amounts are thus possible: zero income if
 
the individual is unemployed, WN if the individual is employed in a
 
noncovered sector job, and WC if the individual is employed in a covered
 
sector job. The corresponding Lorenz curve thus consists of three line
 
segments.
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Figure 16.
 
Lorenz Curves of Labor Income Inequality Before and
 
After a Wage Floor
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The Lorenz curves before and after the wage floor bear a clear
 
relationship to one another: the Lorenz curve with a wage ftoor lies
 
eerywhere below the Lorenz curve without the wage floor, and thus is
 
Lorenz-inferior to it. Lorenz-inferiority is a widely-accepted criterion
 
by which income inequality is judged to increase. Thus, by the Lorenz
 
criterion, a wage floor results in a more unequal (or, equivalently, a less
 
equal) distribution of income.
 
When one Lorenz curve is inferior to another, virtually all of the
 
commonly used inequality indices also signal greater inequality. The
 
income shares of the richest and the roorest, the Gini coefficient, the 
log-variance, and many other familiar measures all indicate greater 
inequality due to the wage floor. 
In sum, a clear conclusion is: 
Proposition 7: 
A wage floor results in a less equal distribution of 
labor incomes. 
The effects on inequality from all sources--labor and other--requires a
 
model of determinants of non-labor incomes; this task is left for another
 
time.
 
C. Effects of Wage Floors on Absolute Poverty
 
Absolute poverty measures look at the size distribution of income
 
differently than do relative inequality measures. Whereas the inequality 
measures are concerned with income shares, poverty measures are concerned 
with income levels.
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Poverty measurement proceeds in two steps. First, a poverty line is
 
defined. This may be done in terms of basic human needs, consiu-'ption, or
 
income. _.We have data on labor incomes, so that is what we will use.
 
Second, a poverty index must be selected. The most widely-used poverty
 
index is the poverty headcount, i.e., the number of people in the labor
 
force with incomes below the poverty line amount. Another possible index,
 
which incorporates the headcount but goes beyond it, is the index suggested
 
by Sen (1976):
 
x -H + (1 - I) G Ip 
where i - the Sen poverty index, 
H - headcount of poverty, 
I average income shortfall among the poor - poverty line
 
minus average income of the poor, and
 
G - Gini coefficient among the poor.
p
 
By this measure, poverty increases whenever more people are in poverty, the
 
poor on average are poorer, or income inequality among the poor (as
 
measured by the Gini coefficient) is greater. Because the Sen index takes
 
more 
features of poverty than just the number poor it is preferred to the
 
headcount by many.
 
How does a wage floor affect poverty? The answer depends on where the
 
poverty line is drawn and which poverty index is used. I shall now show
 
that the wage floor might raise poverty or lower it.
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Consider three examples:
 
Example One:
 
Suppose the poverty line income is higher than
 
the initial market-clearing wage WO . Using the
 
headcount index, everyone in the labor force is poor.
 
Suppose now that the wage floor is imposed at a
 
level greater than the poverty line. Those employed
 
in the covered sector now receive a wage
 
above the poverty line. Poverty thus falls.
 
Example Two:
 
Suppose the poverty line income is less than
 
the original wage so that nobody is poor prior to the
 
wage floor. After the wage floor, the unemployed
 
have incomes below the poverty line amount. Using
 
the headcount measures of poverty, poverty thus
 
rises.
 
Example Three:
 
Use the Sen index of poverty. Suppose the
 
poverty line income is greater than the wage floor in
 
the cov3red sector. Everybody is poor before the
 
wage floor and afterwards as well, so the headcount
 
of poverty is unchanged. Assume the economy in
 
question is characterized by an elastic demand for
 
labor in the covered sector, so that when the wage
 
floor is imposed, workers move on balance from the
 
covered sector into the noncovered sector. Let the
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wage in the noncovered sector fall as more workers
 
enter that sector. Under these conditions, as shown
 
'above, the total wage bill paid to labor falls. This
 
means that the average income shortfall of the poor
 
rises. And, as we have also seen, income inequality
 
among the poor increases by all Lorenz-Ldsed measures
 
including the Gini coefficient. Thus, of the three
 
components of the Sen index, the wage floor leaves H
 
unchanged, raises Y, and raises Gp. The Sen index
 
of poverty therefore rises.
 
These examples have demonstrated:
 
Proposition 8:
 
A wage floor can increase or decrease absolute poverty.
 
Whether poverty rises or falls when a wage floor is imposed depends upon
 
where the poverty line income is defined and which poverty index is used.
 
D. Wage Floors and Economic Efficiency: Static and Dynamic Aspects
 
One more charge against wage floors is a criticism voiced mostly by 
public economists: that wage floors are economically inefficient. Both 
static and dynamic inefficiencies are cited. 
The static inefficiency arguments are of two kinds. One concerns
 
unemployment. The argument goes that the economy operates inside its
 
production possibilities frontier whenever resources are unemployed. Since
 
wage floors cause unemployment, potentially productive resources are
 
unused, and this is inefficient. The other inefficiency argument regards
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the wage floor as a price distortion. Price distortions create a wedge
 
between marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation
 
in various sectors of the economy. Employers might, for example; seek to
 
compensate for higher labor costs by utilizing more 
capital-intensive
 
production methods in sectors covered by the wage floor and, to the extent
 
possible, to shift production to uncovered industries/localities/ ....
 
Neoclassicists would reason that profits would be lower when a wage floor
 
is imposed---the argument being that if profits could be raised by paying
 
higher wages, profit-maximizing firms would have chosen voluntarily to do
 
so.
 
In the context of a developing economy, dynamic efficiency must also
 
be addressed. The lower p.-ffts attributable to a wage floor would
 
presumably lower investment, which would slow the rate of economic growth.
 
Because the demand for labor is derived from the supply and demand for
 
product, the modern sectors would be expected to expand less rapidly due to
 
the wage floor. Hence, the trajectory of the demand for labor in the
 
modern sectors would be lower with a wage floor than without it. It would
 
also be expected that smaller shifts in the demand for labor would pull
 
wages up less rapidly, resulting in a flatter wage trajectory undcr a wage
 
floor, and quite possibly a uniformly lower wage trajectory as well. Thus,
 
a wage floor may be presumed to generate several kinds of intertemporal
 
inefficiencies.
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The dynamic effects Just presented are intuitive hunches only. No
 
formal model exists to test them. Building such a model merits pr;Lority in
 
future work.1
 
E. Summation
 
In sum, we have reached the following conclusions about the income
 
distribution effects of wage floors:
 
*The total wage bill paid to labor may rise cr fall.
 
*Inequality of labor incomes increases.
 
*Absolute poverty may rise or fall.
 
It is thus quite possible for the wage floor to have quite adverse distri­
butional consequences.
 
We have also speculated that a wage floor is likely to result in
 
Nstatic and dynamic inefficiencies.
 
1 	To make sure that I hadn't missed something important in the literature, I
 
wrote to a number of leading economists to ask whether the effects of
 
minimum wages or other wage floors had been studied in a dynamic
 
development model. Robert Solow replied that to his knowledge no such
 
model exists and suggested I construct one.
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
 
A. Overview of Results
 
This.has been a long paper containing many results. Here, I shall 
highlight some of the main points.
 
The question under investigation has been: what are the development 
effects of a wage floor imposed by such forces as trade unions or minimum 
wage legislation? In order to address this question, an analytical 
framework needed to be chosen. First, in recognition of the fact that wage 
floors typically are more important in some sectors of an economy than in 
others, a framework was specified with two sectors: covered and non­
covered. Then, in recognition of the fact that wage floors appear to 
engender search unemployment, a model with this feature was set forth. The 
preferred model is one that was originated by Harris and Todaro (1970) and 
Harberger (1971), and has since been used by Corden and Findlay (1975), 
Fields (1975), Stiglitz (1982), and others. The articles by Minc3r (1976) 
and Gramlich (1976) contain this model as a special case. 
Using this model, eight formal propositions were derived in this
 
paper. They are:
 
1. A wage floor causes unemployment.
 
2. A sector-specific wage floor induces movement of labor out of the
 
covered sector if the demand for labor in the covered sector is elastic and
 
into the covered sector if the labor demand is inelastic.
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3. For any given wage floor and for any given elasticity of wage in
 
the noncovered sector with respect to the size of that sector's labor
 
force: (.a) A greater elasticity of demand for labor in rhe covered sector
 
may result in less unemployment. (b) A greater elaoticity of demand for
 
labor in the covered sector may result in more unemployment.
 
4. For any given wage floor and for any given elasticity of demand
 
for labor in the covered sector: (a) If the demand for labor in the
 
covered sector is elastic, then the more elastic is the wage in the
 
noncovered sector with respect to the size of that sector's labor force,
 
the higher is unemployment; (b) If the demand for labor in the covered
 
sector is inelastic, then the more elastic is the wage in the noncovered
 
sector with respect to the size of that sector's labor force, the lower is
 
unemployment.
 
5. (a) A higher wage floor may result in more unemployment in
 
equilibrium. (b) A higher wage floor may result in less vnemployment in
 
equilibrium.
 
6. (a) The total wage bill will rise if the wage floor moves people
 
out of the noncovered sector and those who remain receive a higher wage.
 
This happens if i) the demand for labor in the covered sector is inelastic
 
and ii) the elasticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to
 
the noncovered sector labor force is nonzero. (b) The total wage bill
 
will fall if the wage floor moves people into the noncovered sector and the
 
wage falls there. This happens if i) the demand for labor in the covered
 
sector is elastic and ii) the elasticity of the wage in the noncovered
 
sector with respect to the noncovered sector labor force is nonzero. (c)
 
The total wage bill will be unchanged if the wage in the noncovered sector
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does not change when a wage floor is imposed in the covered sector. This
 
happens if the elasticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with respect
 
to the noncovered sector labor force is zero.
 
7. A wage floor results in a less equal distribution of labor
 
incomes.
 
8. 	A wage floor can increase or decrease absolute poverty.
 
The ambiguity of some of these results may come as a surprise to some
 
readers. In particular, those who might be inclined on the basis of past
 
reading to think that a higher wage floor necessarily results in more
 
unemployment or that a more elastic demand for labor in the covered sector
 
necessarily results in lower unemployment would be mistaken.
 
B. 	Interpretation
 
What do these results imply for a country's wage policy? The goal of
 
an economic system is to provide opportunities for improved standards of
 
living for more people. The question is whether the imposition of a wage
 
floor in key sectors of an economy helps attain that objective.
 
Economists are largely opposed to non-market wage-setting; Opponents
 
of wage floors raise the following points:
 
1. 	A wage floor would be expected to reduce employment
 
in the covered sector, as employers in that sector move
 
up their labor demand curves.
 
2. 	Because of search for the better-paying jobs, a higher wage
 
would induce unemployment.
 
3. 	The economy will be operating inefficiently inside its
 
production-possibilities frontier, because some labor re-­
sources are unemployed and because the marginal rates of
 
transformation and substitution are unequal.
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4. 	Income inequality may well increase due to rising wages
 
for some and falling wages and unemployment for others.
 
5. 	Pbverty may increase because fewer persons are working.
 
6. 	Growth will be impeded due to lower profits and diminished
 
capital formation.
 
These presumed adverse effects have led the great majority of economists to
 
view minimum wages, union wage-setting, and other non-market forms of wage
 
determination as inappropriate mechanisms for trying to achieve widespread
 
improvements in standards of living.
 
Supporters of wage floors react as follows:
 
1. 	A good society would not permit employers to pay workers
 
less than a living wage. It is outrageous that workers
 
who work so hard should be paid so little. The decent
 
thing to do is to mandate a living wage.
 
2. 	Studies have shown that the demand for labor tends to be
 
inelastic. Therefore, when a wage floor is imposed, the total
 
wage bill paid to labor increases. Labor is thus better
 
off as a result.
 
3. 	The economy is full of slack. If employers are fo-ced to pay
 
higher wages, they will be shocked into finding new And better
 
ways of doing things. Higher wages thus benefit not only
 
labor; they force management to be more efficient. The whole
 
economy is better off.
 
80 
4. 	The conclusion that a wage floor lowers employment assumes
 
a perfectly competitive labor market. But in reality, labor
 
markets are far from perfect. Monopsony is pervasive. Under
 
monopsony, a wage floor, if properly chosen, can result in
 
greater employmbnt at the higher wage.
 
5. 	The argument that a wage floor reduces profits and impedes
 
economic growth weights the future too much and the present
 
generation too little.
 
How are these various points offered by the two sides to be evaluated?
 
I view the arguments invoked by the opponents of wage floors as logical 
analytically and well-founded empirically. Logically, the models have
 
become part of standard textbook labor economics and have withstood the 
test of time. Empirically, the evidence is strong. Downward-sloping labor
 
demand curves are hardly excepttonal. Workers' responsiveness to economic
 
incentives in alternative sectors or locations is well-established empiri­
cally. So too is the existence of a labor aristocracy--workers who, by
 
virtue of being employed in a favored part of the economy, receive wages
 
two or three times those of their fellows employed elsewhere. And the
 
development records of those economies in which market wage determination
 
is the norm on the whole far surpass the records of economies which impose
 
or permit wage floors. These theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
 
create a strong presumption against institutionally imposed wage floors.
 
As for the points put forth by wage floor proponents, I evaluate them
 
as follows.
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1. 	I agree that it is outrageous that workers who work so hard
 
should be paid so little. There's nothing fair about that.
 
A3it is it any less outrageous or any more fair to impose a
 
wage floor when the effect is to reduce job opportunities-and
 
create unemployment? The consequences of wage floors cannot
 
be neglected. Paying a living-wage to some while the many
 
others not covered eke out whatever meagre existence they can
 
doesn't make society any more decent.
 
2. 	Suppose labor demand were inelastic, as proponents of wage
 
floors claim. It is true that the total wage bill will rise
 
if a wage floor is imposed. But, although labor as a whole
 
may earn more, in the absence of distributional mechanisms,
 
those who lose their jobs or cannot find new ones are worse
 
off. Only to the extent that redistribution actually takes
 
place, either publicly (through taxes, government spending,
 
and income maintenance programs) or privately (through
 
remittances, private transfers, etc.) is the total wage
 
bill of labor a sound criterion for those concerned with
 
the well-being of the poor. Anyhow, the demand for labor
 
in a small open economy engaged in international trade
 
is probably quite elastic, reflecting a highly elastic
 
demand for product. In such cases, total wage bill paid
 
to labor would fall if a wage floor were to be imposed, so
 
the argument at the beginning of this paragraph would be
 
moot.
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3. 	The shock effect argument requires a strong belief in
 
inefficiencies. This runs very much contrary to the view
 
that the quest for maximum profits (orthodox terminology)
 
or the incessant drive for capital accumulation (radical
 
terminology) has led firms to be efficient and ever­
maximizing. To believe that firms can be shocked into
 
being more efficient while maintaining that they are
 
always maximizing is logically contradictory. This con­
tradiction seems not to have deterred some of the strongest
 
believers in the acquisitiveness of capitalists from
 
also being ardent spokespersons for shock effects and the
 
inefficiencies of capitalists. Illogic aside, the empiri­
cal evidence for shock effects is less than persuasive.
 
4. 	The monopsony argument must be evaluated in terms of the
 
mobility of labor and the consequent elasticity of supply
 
of labor to the covered sector. If we envision workers
 
in the uncovered sector as constituting a vast reserve
 
army of the underemployed (not a bad assumption, I think-­
precisely the one that motivated the surplus labor models
 
of Lewis and Fei and Rania), then firms in the covered
 
sector may have to raise wages very little if at all in
 
order to attract more labor. In such a case, the result is
 
only a very narrow band within which an exogenously-imposed
 
wage floor would lead the monopsonist to increase employment.
 
A higher wage resulting in less employment is far more likely.
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5. 	The intertemporal issue is one of the potential for economic
 
growth and improvements in labor well-being through saving,
 
investment, and capital-formation. Steady-state growth v4dels
 
w6igh only the tuture. I agree with critics who say those
 
models give too little weight to the present. But it is
 
just as wrong to consider only the present-as it is to consider­
only the future. Rates of time preference must be weighed
 
against the gains from investment and growth. To give no
 
weight to capital and profits and thereby to ignore growth
 
effects and future generations of workers is wrong too.
 
In sum, I am persuaded more by the arguments against wage floors than
 
I am by the counterarguments in their favor. Consequently, -in the absence
 
of evidence to the contrary in a particular context, I am inclined tn
 
regard market wage determination as the preferred labor market regime.
 
In Paper #V and elsewhere, (Fields, 1984, 1985), I have made the case
 
that those East Asian economies that rely largely on market wage deter­
mination have done very well, not only in terms of high GNP growth but also
 
in terms of attainment of full employment, rapidly rising real wages, low
 
to moderate levels of income inequality, and falling absolute poverty. For
 
those very same economies, trade was the engine of growth and of improved
 
standards of living. This creates further presumptive evidence in favor of
 
market wage determination.
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No one questions the desirability of higher standards of living for
 
workers in developing economies. The sooner, the better. Bu-t-pushing
 
wa-gea up prematurely through artificially-set wage floors is probably not
 
the best way to go about it and may well be counterproductive. Policies
 
aimed at enhancing a country's ability to produce profitably and effi­
ciently for the world market hold out more promise. Such policies are
 
analyzed further in subsequent papers.
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